Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47771 March 11, 1978
PEDRO G. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NATIONAL TREASURER, and KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47803 March 11, 1978
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC); LEONARDO B. PEREZ, Chairman-COMELEC; VENANCIO S. DUQUE, FLORES A. BAYOT, CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, VENANCIO L. YANEZA, Commissioners-COMELEC; JAIME LAYA, Budget Commissioner; and GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, National Treasurer, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47816 March 11, 1978
YOUTH DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, RAMON PAGUIRIGAN, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-47767 March 11, 1978
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTION CODE OF 1978 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, petitioner.
G.R. No. L-47791 March 11, 1978
B. ASUNCION BUENAFE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-47827 March 11, 1978
REYNALDO T. FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JAIME LAYA, as the BUDGET COMMISSIONER, GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, as the NATIONAL TREASURER, KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, and LAKAS NG BAYAN, respondents.
Pedro G. Peralta in his own behalf.
Nemesio C. Garcia, Jr., Rodrigo H. Melchor, Dante, S. David, Julie David-Feliciano & Juan T. David for petitioner Juan T. David.
Raul M. Gonzalez & Associates for petitioners Youth Democractic Movement, et al.
Gualberto J. de la Llana in his own behalf.
B. Asuncion Buenafe in his own behalf
Binay Cueva, Fernandez & Associates for petitioner Reynaldo T. Fajardo.
Tolentino Law Office for respondent Kilusang Bagong Lipunan.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for Commission of Elections (COMELEC).
ANTONIO, J.:
These six (6) consolidated petitions pose for the determination of this Court the constitutionality of specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1269).
I
The first issue posed for resolution is: Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, subparagraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply waiting in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of article XII-C of the Constitution.
The specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code which are assailed as being in violation of the equal protection clause are the following:
SEC. 140. Manner of preparing the ballot. —The voter upon receiving his folded ballot shall forthwith proceed to one of the empty voting booths and shall there fill his ballot by writing in the proper space for each office the name of the candidate for whom he desires to vote: Provided, That in the election of regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the voter may choose to vote for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces of the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, but if for any reason he chooses to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation, by writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation: Provided further, That the ballots for the election of regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prepared by the Commission in such manner that the voter may vote for the straight ticket of a political party, group or aggrupation or for individual candidates, and for this purpose, the ticket of a regularly organized political party, group or aggrupation as certified under oath by their respective directorates or duly authorized representatives as wen as candidates not belonging to any particular political party, group or aggrupation, shall be printed in the upper portion of said ballots in a manner which does not give undue advantage to any political party, group or aggrupation or candidate, and there shall also be a column containing blank spaces for the names of such candidates which spaces are to be filled by the voter who does not desire to vote for a straight ticket: Provided, finally, That a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party, group or aggrupation; if he is included in the ticket of more than one political party, group or aggrupation presenting different sets of candidates, he shall immediately inform the Commission as to which ticket he chooses to be included, and if he fails to do so, he shall cease to be considered to belong to any ticket. The following notice shall be printed on the ballot: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party, group or aggrupation in the space indicated. It shag then be unnecessary for you to write the names of Candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties, groups or aggrupations and/or for individual candidates, write in the respective blank spaces the names of the candidates you vote for and the names written by you in the respective blank spaces in the ballot shall then be considered as validly voted for.
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 155. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. — In the reading and appreciation of ballots, the committee shall observe the following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
26. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation.
27. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation and the votes for the individual candidates written on the ballot shall be considered as stray votes.
28. If a voter has written in the proper space of his ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, an of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray votes and shall not be counted. Provided, however, That if the number of candidates nominated by the political party, group or aggrupation written by the voter in the ballot is less than the number of seats to be filled in the election and the voter also writes the names of individual candidates in the spaces provided therefor not belonging to the ticket of the political party, group or aggrupation he has written in the ballot, the ballot shall be counted as votes in favor of the candidates of the political party, group or aggrupation concerned and the individual candidates whose names were firstly written by the voter in the spaces provided therefor, until the authorized number of seats is fined.
The system which allows straight party voting is not unique in the Philippine experience. As early as 1941, the Second National Assembly of the Philippines enacted Commonwealth Act No. 666, entitled "An Act to Provide for the First Election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, Under the Constitution and the Amendments Thereof." Said Commonwealth Act enabled the voter to vote for individual candidates or for a straight party ticket by writing either the names of the candidates of his choice or of the political party he favored on designated blank spaces on the ballot.1
While the original Election Code, Commonwealth Act No. 357, dated August 22, 1938, did not carry provisions for optional straight party voting,2 the system was, however, substantially reinstituted in Republic Act No. 180, or the Revised Election Code, enacted on June 21, 1947.3 The only im portent difference introduced was that in appreciating ballots on which the voter had written both the name of a political party and the names of candidates not members of said party, Republic Act No. 180 provided that the individual candidates whose names were written shall be considered voted for,4 whereas Commonwealth Act No. 666 provided that the vote shall be counted in favor of the political party.5
Likewise, it should be noted that in other jurisdictions, ballots providing for optional straight party voting have been accepted as a standard form, in addition to the "office-block" ballots in which all candidates for each office grouped together. Among the different states of the United States, for example, the following has been observed:
The party-column ballot, used in about 30 states, is sometimes called the Indiana-type ballot because the Indiana law of 1889 has served as a model for other states. In most states using the party column ballot, it is possible to vote for the candidates of a single party for all offices by making a single cross in the circle at the head of the column containing the party's candidates. In some states, the party emblem is carried at the top of its column, a feature which, in less literate days, was of some utility in guiding the voter to the right column on the ballot. To vote a split ticket on a party-column ballot usually requires the recording of a choice for each office, path the voter will presumably hesitate to follow when he has the alternative of making a single crossmark. Professional party workers generally favor the use of the party-column ballot because it encourages straight ticket voting. ...
In contrast with the party-column ballot is the office-block ballot, or, as it is sometimes called by virtue of its origin, the Massachussetts ballot. Names of all candidates, by whatever party nominated, for each office are grouped together on the office-block ballot, usually with an indication alongside each name of the party affiliation. The supposition is that the voter will be compelled to consider separately the candidates for each ballot, in contrast with the encouragement given to straight-ticket voting by the party column ballot. Pennsylvania uses a variation of the office-block ballot: the candidates are grouped according to office but provision is made for straight-ticket voting by a single mark.6
Election laws providing for the Indiana-type ballot, as aforementioned, have been held constitutional as against the contention that they interfere with the freedom and equality of elections. Thus, in Oughton, et al. v. Black, et al.,7 assailed as unconstitutional was a statutory proviso which required that ballots should be printed with the following instructions: "To vote a straight party ticket, mark a cross (x) in the square opposite the name of the party of your choice, in the first column. a crossmark in the square opposite the name of any candidate indicates a vote for that candidate."
It was contended that such provision interferes with the freedom and equality of elections, and authorizes a method of voting for political parties and not 'or men. It was alleged that the special privilege given to straight ticket voters and denied to others injured appellants, who, as candidates, were opposed by other candidates who can much more easily be voted for. In resolving such question and declaring the law valid, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the "free and equal exercises of the elective franchise by every elector is not impaired by the statute, but simply regulated. The regulation is for the convenience of the electors. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark while another may be required to make two or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution, and lies in the sound discretion of the Legislature."8
The Pennsylvania Court further emphasized that elections are equal when the vote of every candidate is equal in its influence on the result, to the vote of every candidate; when each ballot is as effective as every other ballot.9
To the same effect is the holding in Ritchie v. Richards, which sustained the validity of a statute containing a similar provisional.10
At any rate, voting by party has been accepted in various states as a form of democratic electoral process. In Israel, for example, where the election system is one of proportional representation in which each political party presents a list of candidates to the citizenry, the voter selects a party, not a candidate, and each party is then represented in the Knesset in proportion to its strength on the polls. The head of the largest party is asked to form a government.11 In France, on the other hand, under the electoral law of October 5, 1946, providing for the selection of National Assembly members, a list system of proportional representation was set up, whereby each electoral area elected several candidates in proportion to its voting strength. The voter was required to vote only for one party list; he could not split his vote among several candidates on different party lists, but could depart from the order of preference set up by the party. Commissioners then count the ballots for each party list and distribute the total number of seats among the different successful parties.12 In Italy and West Germany, party voting is likewise in practice, and proportional representation seats are distributed on the basis of the number of votes received by the successful parties.
Petitioners in the cases at bar invoke the constitutional mandate that no person shag be denied the equal protection of the laws (Article IV, Section 1) and the provision that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment or discrimination" (Article XII-C, Section 9[l]). The word "discrmination" in the latter provision should be construed in relation to the equal protection clause and in the manner and degree in which it is taken therein, since said provision "is in line with the provision of the Bill of Rights that no 'person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws' ".13
The main objection of petitioners against the optional straight party' voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it discontended that the candidate who is not a party member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 1 of Article IV, in relation to Section 9 of Article XII, of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.14 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.15 There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made in accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded.' There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike. It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to foresee and provide for every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division.16
Classification which has some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety.17
In the cases at bar, the assailed classification springs from the alleged differential treatment afforded to candidates who are party members as against those who run as independents. It must be emphasized in the election law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon a reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.18 The factual foundation to demonstrate invalidity must be established by the litigant challenging its constitutionality.19 These principles are predicated upon the presumption in favor of constitutionality.
This has to be so because of "the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.20
Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be "a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication."21 There is practical unanimity among the courts in the pronouncement "that laws shag not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.22
We shall now test the validity of petitioners' arguments on the basis of these principles.
In the challenged provision of the electoral law, unlike the previous block- voting statutes, all the names of the candidates, whether of parties, groups or independent candidates, are printed on the ballot. Before he prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is His. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail hihiself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disavantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.
In the ordinary course of things, those who join or become members of associations, such as political parties or any other lawful groups or organizations, necessarily enjoy certain benefits and privileges which are incident to, or are consequences of such membership. Freedom of association has been enshrined in the Constitution to enable individuals to join others of like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in lawful activities. Membership in associations is considered as an extension of individual freedom. Effective advocacy of both public and private views or opinions is undeniably enhanced by group association. Freedom to engage in associations for the advancement of beliefs and Ideas is, therefore, an inseparable aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the fundamental law. Therefore, if, as an incident of joining a political party, group or aggrupation, the candidate is given certain privileges, this is constitutionally Permissible. Thus, under the provisions of the previous election laws, only the parties who polled the largest and the next largest number of votes in the last preceding presidential elections were entitled to representation in the Board of Election Inspectors.23 Independent candidates had no representation in the Board; and yet it was never contended that the independent candidates were denied the equal protection of the laws.
The official candidates of an organized political party may be distinguished from an independent candidate. The former are bound by the party's rules. They owe loyalty to the party, its tenets, its policies, its platform and programmes of government. To the electorate, they represent the party, its principles, ideals and objectives. This is not true of an independent candidate. If the electoral law has bias in favor of political parties, it is because political parties constitute a basic element of the democractic institutional apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, activity or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. In modern nines the political party has become the instrument for the organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists with the consent of the governed. Political parties per. form an "essential function in the management of succession to power, as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the national weal."24
The Constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government. Such a system implies the existence of responsible political parties with distinct programmes of government.
The parliamentary system works best when party distinctions are well defined by differences in principle. As observed by a noted authority on political law, under a parliamentary system; "the maintenance and development party system becomes not only necessary but indispensable for the enforcement of the idea and the rule of government responsibility and accountability to the people in the political management of the country."25 Indeed, the extent to which political parties can become effective instruments of self-government depends, in the final analysis, on the degree of the citizens' competence in politics and their willingness to contribute political resources to the parties.
It is also contended that the system of optional straight party voting is anathema to free, orderly and honest elections or that it encourages laziness or political irresponsibility. These are objections that go to the wisdom of the statute. It is well to remember that this Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom or expediency of legislation. We have reiterated in a previous case that: "It is ... settled ... that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid."26 This notwithstanding, We deem it necessary, for the information of everyone concerned, to explain why such fears, in a growing climate of political maturity and social responsibility appear conjectural.
There are no data to show that the system herein assailed was the proximate cause of all the frauds in the 1941, 1947 and 1949 elections. Besides, all procedures or manners of voting are susceptible to fraud. The important thing to consider is that the 1978 Election Code is replete with new provisions designed to guarantee the sanctity and secrecy of the people's vote.
As demonstrated in the experience of other democratic states, such a system has its advantages. It may enable deserving young candidates — but without adequate financial resources of their own — to win, with party support, in countrywide or regional elections. Since candidates of a party or group may pool their resources, it will tend to make elections less expensive. As this system of voting favors the strongly organized parties or groups, it tends to prevent the proliferation of political parties or groups. It thus results in the formation of stable and responsible political parties. On the part of the electorate, such a system of voting facilitates the exercise of their right of suffrage. It enables the laborer, the farmer and the voter of ordinary education to vote with greater facility for all the official candidates of the party of his choice. It thus broadens the ways and means by which the sovereign will can be expressed.
Nor could it be true, as petitioners contend, that a system which allows straight ticket voting encourages laziness and political irresponsibility. While there may be those who may be moved to vote straight party by reason of lack of interest, nevertheless, there are still those sufficiently interested to cast an intelligent vote. It has been observed that in a straight ticket the motivated voter is more likely to organize his ballot in a highly structure pattern. His motivation may derive from an interest in parties, candidates, or issues or any combination of those. As observed by a survey research group: "Motivated straight ticket voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible. Such a voter does not scatter his choices casually, he has a political direction in mind and he implements it through the choice of one party or the other on the ballot. The more highly motivated he is toward this political objective, the less willing he is to dilute his vote by crossing party lines."27
II
The second issue before Us is: Whether or not the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 14 of the 1978 Election Code, which authorize the elections of the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa by regions, violate Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the members of the National Assembly shall be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities.
Assailed as unconstitutional are the following provisions of the 1978 Election Code:
SEC. 11. Composition. — The interim Batasang Pambansa shall be composed of the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shag not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet."
SEC. 12. Apportionment of regional representatives. — There shall be 160 regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen regions of the nation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio ... :
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing apportionment shall be not considered a precedent in connection with the re-apportionment of representative districts for the regular National Assembly under Section 2, Article VIII and Section 6, Article XVI I of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the number of regional representative for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. There are also allotted two additional seats for regional representatives to Region IV in view of inhabitants, such as students, in the region not taken into account in the 1975 census.
SEC. 14. Voting by region. — Each region shall be entitled to such number of regional representatives as are allotted to it in Section 12 of Article II hereof. All candidates for region representatives shall be voted upon at large by the registered voters of their respective regions. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes from the entire region shall be declared elected.
The constitutional provision relied upon is Section 2 of Article VIII, which provides:
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall be composed of as many Members as may be provided by law to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall Comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Representative districts or provinces already created or existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shag have at least one Member each.
In resolving the issue, the provisions of Amendment No. 1 to the Constitution, which took effect on October 27, 1976, should be considered and not, as pointed out by petitioner Juan T. David, those of Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which deal with the composition of the regular National Assembly.
It should be recalled that under the term of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution,28 the membership of the interim National Assembly would consists of the Incumbent President and Vice-President, the Senators and the Representatives of the old Congress and the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason.
By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character of a plebiscite which would be held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as expressed overwhelmingly in the plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing the interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim Batasang Pambansa. T was intended as a preparatory and experimental step toward the establishment of full parliamentary government as provided for in the Constitution.
Amendment No. 1 provides:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa, Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa, which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
The provisions of the Above Amendment are clear. Instead of providing that representation in the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be by representative districts, it specifically provides that; (1) the representatives shall be elected from the different regions of the nation; and (2) the "Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sector shall be determined by law. " No mention whatsoever is made of 4 provinces, representative districts and cities". Where the intent is to relate to the regular National Assembly, the Constitution made it clear and manifest, as indicated in Amendment No. 2 of the Constitution.29 It is significant to note that nowhere in the said amendment is it provided that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned among the representative districts, in the same manner as the regular National Assembly. The clear import and intent of the Constitutional Amendment is, therefore, the election of the representatives from the different regions of the nation, and such regional representatives shall be alloted or distributed among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Neither does the Amendment provide that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa "shall be elected by the qualified electors in their respective district for term of six years ..." as provided in Section 3[l] of Article VIII of the Constitution. To hold that Section 3[l] of Article VIII is applicable to the interim Batasang Pambansa would lead to the conclusion that the members of the Batasan shall have a term of six years, which is of course inconsistent with its transitory character. That the interim Batasang Pambansa is a distinct and special body, which, by reason of its transitory nature should be governed by specifically formulated rules, is apparent from the constitutional amendment which created it. Thus, its membership "shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law. " Furthermore, it "shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet." The regular National Assembly, on the other hand, is limited in its membership to representatives to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities. By reason of its provisional character, the interim Batasang Pambansa has to be more flexible, both in its representation and the manner of election of its members. There is no denying the fact that as wide a range of representation as possible is required in order to hasten the nation's return to normalcy. It is for t reason that sectors are given adequate representation30 and are considered as "national aggrupations. " Elections of sectoral representatives are specially provided for in the 1978 Election Code.31 It should be emphasized that the regular National Assembly is distinct and different in composition, powers and manner of elections of its members from the interim Batasang Pambansa is to function during the period of transition while the regular National Assembly is to operate upon the restoration of normalcy.
The composition of the interim Batasang Pambansa is indeed experimental. It is an experiment in size, form and distribution of constituencies in the hope of securing a legislature most truly representative of the views of the electorate. It would, therefore, be ludicrous to confine the members of such body within the strictures of the representative districts of the regular National Assembly. The fear of petitioner Juan T. David that several representative districts will be deprived of representation misconstrues the concept of regional elections. The representatives are to be elected by the voters of the entire region. They will represent the whole region and not merely its integral provinces, districts or cities. Moreover, Section 12 of the Code ensures that there shall be sufficient representatives for each region by providing that "the number of regional representatives for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution."
III
The following two issues raised by petitioners are interrelated and must be jointly discussed herein. They are:
(a) Whether or not the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) may be registered and accredited as political parties under Section 8 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, so that their respective candidates for membership in the interim Batasang Pambansa may be voted for as a group under the 1978 Election Code; and
(b) Whether or not members of a political party in the l971 elections may run under the ticket sponsored by any other party, group or aggrupation, considering the provisions of Section 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution which prohibition candidates for any elective public office from changing party affiliation within six months s immediately preceding or following an election
The resolution of the foregoing issues calls for the determination of the constitutionality of Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code, questioned by petitioners. Said section provides:
SEC. 199. Registration of political parties. — Pending the promulgation of rules and regulations to govern the registration and accreditation of political parties by the Commission in accordance with Article XII[C] of the Constitution, the registration with the Commission previous to 1972 of the Nacionalista Party, Liberal Party, Citizens' Party, and other national parties shall be deemed to continue and they may, upon notice to the Commission through their respective presidents or duly authorized representatives, amend or change their names, constitutions, by-laws, or other organizational papers, platfor, officers and members, and shag be entitled to nominate and support their respective candidates for representatives in the interim Batasang Pambansa. Similarly, any other group of persons pursuing the same political Ideals in government may register with the Commission and be entitled to the same rights and privileges.
Invoked by petitioner are Sections 8 and 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, which provide:
SEC. 8. A political party shall be entitled to accreditation by the Commission if, in the immediately preceding election, such party has obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. No religious sect shall be registered as political party, and no political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence or subversion shall be entitled to accreditation.
SEC. 10. No elective public officer may change political party affiliation during term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding g or following an election.
It should be recalled that the object of the afore-quoted provisions of the Constitution was to develop a third party and break the heretofore dominant hold on the political system by the two major political parties which have been in existence since the birth of the republic. These two major parties were considered as "in fact a one party system with two factions openly disagreeing on fringe issues but tacitly united by one common aim: alternate monopoly of power through a pattern of patronage politics."32 The framers of the Constitution examined the weaknesses of the party system and saw the need "for discarding the old party system as a political farce that has been largely responsible for many of the country's ills ...".33 They envisioned, therefore, a new era in Philippine politics, where elections were to be decided on issues rather than on personalities, and where the electoral process was to be free, less expensive government depends on an organized and vigorous citizenry. Such can only exist if citizens can increase their effectiveness in politics by modernizing and using political parties to set the general directions of public policy and to influence the specific decisions of public institutions that affect their daily lives.
It was intended, however, that some of these provisions would not operate during the interim period. Thus, from the wording of Section 8, it is obvious that said section is incapable of application during the first election because it states that no political party shall be entitled to accreditation unless in the immediately preceding election, it obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. That there cannot be any accreditation during the first election under the 1973 Constitution is evident from the sponsorship speech of the proponent of t constitutional provision.34
Although their members are united by common policies and principles of government and apparently impelled by the same political Ideals, neither the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) nor the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) professes to be a political party in the sense of a stable organization with a degree of permanence, imposing strict discipline among the members, and with a party platform drafted and ratified in a party convention. It does not follow, however, that the KBL and LABAN are not political parties, in a generic sense, since a political party has been generally defined as "an association of voters believing in certain principles of government, formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like belief."35. Political parties "result from the voluntary association of electors, and do not exist by operation of law. The element of time is not essential to the formation of a legal party; it may spring into existence from the exigencies of a particular election, and with no intention of continuing after the exigency has passed."36 As a matter of fact, it is only the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) that have polarized the major differences on vital public issues affecting the nation. And, during t first election in t period of transition when, obviously, no political party can be accredited, does the Constitution, in Article XII-C, Sections 2[5] and 8 limit registration to political parties as strictly understood by withholding it from aggrupations of persons pursuing the same political Ideals of government as provided in Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code? It clearly does not. The listing of political parties appears to have a dual aspect — registration and accreditation Registration is a means by which the government is enabled to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.
It would appear from Section 8 of Article XII-C that the only groups which cannot be registered are: (a) religious groups or sects; and (b) those political parties or groups who seek "to achieve its goals through violence and subversion". Accreditation is the means by which the registration requirement is made effective by conferring benefits to registered political parties. The condition for accreditation, aside from those mentioned, is that the political party must have obtained, in the immediately preceding election, at least "the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. " The Constitution, however, does not state what are the effects of accreditation. There is, therefore, necessity for legislation. Moreover, to construe the term "political party" restrictively would delimit the supervisory authority of the Commission on Elections. More specifically, it would exempt aggrupations or other political groups from certain requirements. Under Section 199, the 1978 Election Code allows the registration of aggrupations or groups of persons "pursuing the same political Ideals in government"; consequently, they are subjected to the regulation of propaganda materials (Sec. 41) and the limitation of expenses for candidates (Sec. 52).
From another point of view, a narrow construction may discourage the robust exercise of the right of association guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which at t stage of our political tory appears, necessary.
The facts that the coming polls will be the first that we shall hold since the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972 makes it an event of no ordinary significance. "The Filipino society has outgrown its age of innocence. Today the acts of Filipino politicians must be judged by more mature standards and the test of national allegiance has become more strict and more demanding, even more binding."37 By t election, we shall inaugurate a new stage in our political life, and commence our fateful transition from crisis government to a parliamentary system.
But as President Ferdinand E. Marcos has significantly observed:
... this step, I repeat, is no mere restoration of electoral processes and representative government. The coming elections would be a perilous exercise indeed if they would merely return us to elections and representative institutions as we had known them in the past, and compromise what had taken us so much time and effort to construct over the last five years.
What we envision in t initiative is the permanence and continuity of the refor that we have launched under the aegis of crisis government. We envision in it the full emergence of a new political order that will give life and sustenance to our national vision of a new society.ᇈWᑭHIL And it will have permanence and continuity because by the grace of suffrage and representative government, we shag thereby attain a formal mechanism for the exercise of participation and involvement by our people in nation-building and national development.38
It is, therefore, necessary at t stage to encourage the emergence or growth of political parties that will truly reflect the opinions and aspirations of our people. The right of individuals to form associations as guaranteed by the fundamental law, includes the freedom to associate or refrain from association.39 In accord with t constitutional precept, it is recognized that no man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party, or, after having become such, to remain a member.40
The existence of responsible political parties with distinct programs of government is essential to the effectiveness of a parliamentary system of government. It is in recognition of t fact that Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code allows or sanctions the registration of groups of persons "pursuing the same political ideals in government" with the Commission on Elections. Moreover, to what extent the rights of organized political parties should be regulated by law is a matter of public policy to be determined by the lawmaker — a matter which does not concern the courts.41
T brings us to the next point raised by petitioners, namely, that under Section 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, no candidate for elective office may change party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election. In the cases at bar, We understand that no candidate voluntarily changed party affiliation. On the contrary, the claim that the KBL and the LABAN are not political parties" is based partly on the fact that the candidates running under their banners have retained their party affiliation. Section 10 is a statement of a basic principle against political opportunism. To begin with, no legislation has been enacted to implement t constitutional prohibition. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how the courts may apply the prohibition, in all the varied facts and circutances under which it may be invoked, without the aid of supplementary legislation. For instance, the provision in question states that no elective public officer may change political party affiliation during term of office. Suppose an elected representative in the legislature, belonging to one party, shall always vote and side with another political party. Will he be considered a "turncoat" even if he does not formally change party affiliation? Suppose it be decided that he is a "turncoat". What sanctions should be adopted? Should he be suspended or ousted from the legislature?
When one turns to political candidates, the same questions as to what should be considered "political opportunism" or "turncoatism" will be encountered. But the problem of procedure for hearing and deciding infringements of the prohibition or the determination of the appropriate sanction becomes more acute. Is the sanction to be found in the refusal by the Commission on Elections to register the party or group, or in the denial of certificate of candidacy, or are there other ways? Should political parties be prevented from "adopting" candidates? Or from forming coalitions?
All of these are questions of policy, in resolving winch many immensurable factors have to be considered. The afore-cited constitutional provisions are commands to the legislature to enact laws to carry out the constitutional purpose. They are, therefore, addressed initially to the lawmaking department of the government. It is not part of the judicial department to deal with such questions without their authoritative solutions by the legislative department. It may be relevant to emphasize here that the jurisdiction of t Court is "limited to cases and controversies, presented in such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial power is capable of acting upon them, and pronouncing and carrying into effect a judgment between the parties, and does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or a real case."42
In any event, We cannot perceive how such constitutional prohibition could be applied in t first election. Precisely, the overriding constitutional purpose is to remove the dominant hold of the two major political parties and encourage the formation of new political parties. The intention is not to rebuild old party coalitions but to define new political means and instruments, within the parties or beyond them, that will allow the Filipino people to express their deeper concerns and aspirations through popular government.
IV
The fourth issue is: whether or not the forty-five-day period of campaign prescribed in the 1978 Election Code violates the Constitution because. (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C; and (b) the period should cover at least ninety (90) days.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides:
SEC. 4. Election and campaign periods. — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII-C of the Constitution.ℒαwρhi৷ The period of campaign shall not be more than forty- five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978.
In support of the allegation of unconstitutionality, petitioners rely on Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
At the outset, it should be considered that Amendment No. 1 provides that the "number of representatives from each region and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law " (emphasis supplied). Under Amendment No. 5, "the incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." The power conferred by these Amendment upon the lawmaker necessarily included the authority to prescribe the date and procedure for the holding of such elections. It should be borne in mind that the forthcoming election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa will be a special election during a regime of martial law. It is, therefore, an election in a state of emergency. The exigencies of the situation require that it be governed by special rules. At t point, the objective is to hasten the normalization of government and, at the same time, to ensure that the nation is not exposed to the same critical proble that necessitated the declaration of martial law. In conferring upon the incumbent President the authority to determine the date of the election, those who drafted the Amendments must have realized that it is only the incumbent President who has the authority and the means of obtaining, through the various facilities in the civil and military agencies of the government, information on the peace and order condition of the country, and to determine the period within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all the regions of the nation. Thus, the 1978 Election Code was formulated to meet a special need, and t is emphasized by the fact that the Code itself limits its application.43
Even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period for campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission on Elections has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code.
At any rate, insofar as objections to the fixing of the campaign period for elections in general are concerned, it is apparent that there is a distinction between the ter "election period" and "campaign period". Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code provides that the "election period shag be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII (C) of the Constitution." The "campaign period", however, has been fixed so that "it shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shag commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978." The distinction is further made apparent by the fact that the "election period" under Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution extends even beyond the day of the election itself, while the "campaign period", by reason of its nature and purpose, must necessarily be before the elections are held. There is, therefore, no conflict with the constitutional provision.
At t juncture, it may be relevant to note the efforts of the Commission on Elections to give more substance and meaning to the intent and spirit of the Constitution and the 1978 Election Code by giving the same practicable opportunities to candidates, groups or parties involved in the April 7, 1978 interim Batasang Pambansa elections. Thus, in Resolution No. 1289, the COMELEC removed the so-called undue advantage which the Nacionalista Party and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) had over the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) in ter of authorized election expenses, appointment of election watchers and use of print and broadcast media. T circutance, contrary to the clai of petitioners, shows that the Commission on Elections, as a constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, and with broad powers, functions and duties under the 1973 Constitution, can give candidates, irrespective of parties, equal opportunities under equal circutances.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED, without costs.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 provides:
SEC. 3. ... The ballot shag be prepared in such manner that the voter may vote for a straight party ticket or for individual candidates and for t purpose, the tickets of the regularly organized political parties that participated in the last preceding election for national officials, as certified under oath by the national directorates of the respective parties, shall be printed on the ballot, and there shall also be one column containing blank spaces for the names of candidates for all elective positions to be filled in said election, which spaces are to be fined by the voter who does not desire to vote a straight ticket. The following notice shall be printed on said ballot: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party in the space indicated. It shall then be unnecessary for you to write the names of the candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties and/or for independent or individual candidates, write the names of the candidates you vote for."... .
2 Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 provides:
SEC. 119. Official ballots. — Uniform official ballots shall be provided at public expense for each election. Said ballots shall be of white paper in the shape of a strip one hundred and twenty millimeters wide and two hundred and forty millimeters long, exclusive of the stub and coupon containing the detachable number of the ballot and shall bear at the top the coat of ar of the Commonwealth, the words, "Official Ballot", the name of the municipality and province in which the election is held, the date of the election, and the following notice in eight point gothic type: "Fill out t ballot secretly inside the booth. Do not write anything nor put any distinctive mark thereon but the names of the candidates you vote for. Any violation of t instruction will invalidate your vote." On the body of the ballot shall be printed on the left margin the title of each one of the offices to be voted for in twelve point gothic type, followed by a blank line for the name of the candidate for whom the voter desires to vote, and if more than one is to be elected, the corresponding number of blank lines consecutively numbered, immediately below the title of the office. There shag not be anything on its reverse side. There shall be in the coupon a space for the thumbmark of the voter.
3 Sec. 124, Republic Act No. 180 provides:
SEC. 124. Official Ballots. — ... The ballots for national offices shall be prepared in such manner that the voter may vote for straight ticket of a political party or for individual Candidates, and, for t purpose, the ticket of the regularly organized political parties that participated in the last preceding election for national officials, as certified under oath by the national directorates of the respective parties, shall be printed on said ballots, and there shall also be one column containing blank spaces for the name of candidate for elective national positions to be filled in said election, which spaces are to be filled by the voter who does not desire to vote a straight ticket. The following notice shall be printed on the ballots for national offices: "If you want to vote for all the official candidates of a political party to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party in the space indicated. It shall then be unnecessary for you to write the names of the candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties and/or for independent or individual candidates, write in the respective blank spaces the names of the candidates you vote for and the names written by you in the respective blank spaces of the ballot shall then be considered as validly voted for."...
4 Sec. 149[20] of Republic Act No. 180 provides:
SEC. 149. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. — In the reading and appreciation of ballots, the following rules shall be observed:
20. If a voter should vote for individual candidates for national offices, only the names of the candidates written by him in the respective blank spaces of ballot shall be considered as validly voted for even though he has written on the corresponding space the name of a political party which has nominated official Candidates.
5 Sec. 4[g] of Commonwealth Act No. 666 provides:
SEC. 4. In the reading and appreciation of ballots in making the canvassing, in addition to the rules of appreciation provided for by the Election Code, the boards of inspectors shall observe the following rules:
(g) If a voter had voted for the straight ticket of a political party and at the same time had written on one or more blank spaces of the ballot the names of candidates of other party or parties or of independent candidates, said names shall be deemed as not written and the vote shall be counted as cast for each and every one of the official candidates of the party voted for in the ballot.
6 Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Ed., pp. 641-642. Cf. Sec. 2, of S. 303, Acts (1965) Indiana, Chapter 252; State ex rel Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159. Schmandt & Steinbicker, Fundamentals of Goverment, pp. 273-274.
7 Decided by the Sup. Court of Penn. in 1905. 61 Atlantic 346.
8 The Pennsylvania Court said:
What is the real complaint of the appellants? Whether we confine ourselves to their bill beyond which we ought not to go in looking for it, or search for it in the elaborate briefs of their learned counsel, it is not that the acts of 1893 and 1903 deprive them, as can. candidates, of the right to be voted for by qualified electors, or that the latter are deprived of the right to vote. It is simply that certain electors, in going into the election booths, possessing no higher, but just the same, right to freely cast their votes and have them counted that every other elector in the commonwealth possesses, may mark their tickets more readily and quickly than the elector who, in wishing to assert absolute right of independence of any political party, makes up own ticket, and in doing so necessarily is required to consume more time. In other words, because those voters who insist upon making up their own tickets, as is their unquestioned right, must necessarily make a number of marks, the contention of the appellants is that elections are not equal if other electors may indicate the candidates of their choice by making fewer marks. Because some in giving expression to a freeman's will must make a number of marks, the position of the appellants, as logically understood, is that elections are not equal unless the rest of the electors, satisfied with party nominations and willing to vote for political candidates named, are required to spend as much time in marking their ballots. This is not the test of inequality. Each individual voter as he enters the booth is given an opportunity to freely express wilt with no one by him to influence or intimidate him, and from the face of the ballot he is instructed how to mark it. If unable to understand the instructions, a qualified elector of the district, selected by hielf, may enter the voting apartment and assist him. This is the right given to every elector, and therefore is an equal one. The free and equal exercise of the elective france by every elector is not impaired by the statute, but simply regulated. A regulation for the convenience of certain electors providing that they may — not must — if they desire to vote a straight party ticket, vote for it by marking a cross in the square opposite the name of the party of their choice, is not inequality, as against these complainants. They have the right to vote in precisely the same way for all the candidates on the Municipal League ticket. If they wish to vote for offices for which candidates are not named on their ticket, they not only have the right to do so, but can do so by making the proper marks on the ballot, or writing out the names of their choice. The straight party man — the voter who, as a rule, votes straight party ticket — may, if unwilling to vote for the ticket named by party, omit the cross opposite the party name, and by separate marks on the party ticket indicate those candidates on it for whom he will vote, marking on other tickets those for whom he wishes to vote, instead of the candidates named for the same offices on party ticket. ... .
... They complain of inequality because an elector, in marking ticket from the names found on the official ballot, cannot make it up as readily and quickly as the voter who is given the privilege of voting a straight ticket by making a single mark. But how much more inconvenient is it, and how much more time must necessarily be consumed, when an elector makes up whole ticket by writing the names of those for whom would vote! If marking is inequality, writing is more so. The whole matter is but a regulation, working on inequality, but preserving the equal right to vote. (pp. 347-348).
Quoted in the same case was the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Todd v. Election Commissioners (104 Mich. 474; 62 N.W. 564; 64 N.W. 496; 29 L.R.A. 330), wherein it was said:
The Constitution does not guaranty that each voter shall have the same facilities with every other voter in expressing will at the ballot box, ... The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast ballot by making one mark, while another may be required to make two or more to express will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in the sound discretion of the Legislature, to whom alone such regulation is committed. Courts cannot hold such provisions unconstitutional because, in their judgment, they are harsh or unwise, or have their origin in partisan purposes. Constitutional laws often have their origin in such purposes, and un constitutional laws are often based upon pure motives an honest intentions, Courts have nothing to do with the motives of legislators, nor the reasons they may have for passing the law. The polar star of interpretation to guide them is the language of the Constitution itself, and the sole question always is, does the law destroy or abridge the right. (61 Atlantic 349).
9 The Pennsylvania Court further went on to state:
... In State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 76 N.W. 482, 42 L.R.A. 239, Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah, 345, 47 Pac. 670, and People ex rel. v. Hoffman, et al., 116 111. 587, 5 N.E. 596, 8 N.E. 788, 56 Am. Rep. 793, similar views seem to have been entertained. In the latter case, it was said, "Elections are equal when the vote of, every elector is equal, in its influence on the result, to the vote of every other elector; when each ballot is as effective as every other ballot."... .
What the Legislature has done has been to provide how free and equal elections are to be conducted. It has confined itself to regulating them, and has not gone beyond forbidden limits by interfering with their freedom and equality. It has neither denied, qualified nor restricted the right of every elector to vote freely and for the persons of choice. It has simply told him how he may vote freely and equally with all others, and in doing so has made no distinction that affects freedom or gives him a right that is not equal to that of every other elector to take ballot to the box, as he has made it up, to be counted as vote. This system of regulating free and equal elections would be more than a human device if it did not encounter criticism. Perfect though it were as the wisdom of man could make it, there would still be those among men to point to its defects, and, as in every case of legislation not in accord with the view or sense of right and propriety of those affected by it, the Constitution would be turned to as the shibboleth to strike it down. It may or may not be wise legislation. The convenience of the elector may not have been properly considered when it was passed. Another system might be more convenient, Defects in it may be fairly pointed out, and improvements suggested. But these are not matters for us. Our duty is to apply the touchstone of the Constitution, and if the response is, "Freedom and equality", the act must be upheld. Such is the response here. (p. 349).
10 The Supreme Court of Utah said:
The plaintiff also insist that ballots prepared and printed according to the act of March 28th, above mentioned, and exclusively used at the November election, do not afford equal facilities to vote to all voters; that a ballot may be cast for party candidates with less difficulty than for those candidates who have no emblem on the ballot to represent them; that a partisan can vote easier than an independent; and that the law does not operate equally and uniformly on all voters. It is true that party organizations may, by the observance of certain requirements, have the names of their candidates and their emblem printed on the ticket, while other candidates are required to obtain the signatures of a specified number of voters to a certificate before their name can be printed on the ballot. And by simply placing a cross opposite a party emblem, a vote may be cast for all the candidates of a party, while a vote for any number of candidates of a party less than an can only be given by a cross opposite the name of each candidate; and if a voter wishes to cast a vote for a candidate whose name is not on it, he is obliged to write the name on the ballot, and place a cross opposite to it. Of course the voter should be allowed to perform t duty with the least difficulty and inconvenience consistent with an honest and fair election. No unnecessary impediments or inconveniences should be thrown in way. The system tends to encourage the voting of straight tickets and to discourage independent voting, which some think is an objection. The system has its merits as well as its demerits, and the legislative department of the state government has seen fit, in its wisdom, to enact the law; and we do not feel authorized to overturn the people,'s wilt as expressed through that body, in the law. The court holds that none of the various objections urged by the plaintiff is well founded. We therefore deny the application for the writ. (14 Utah. 345, 47 Pac. 670, 675).
11 Arian, The Choosing People: Voting Behavior In Israel, Press of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland and London, 1973, p. 8.
12 Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II. New York University Press, 1951, p. 53.
13 "A Matter of Elementary Justice", Sponsorship speech of Delegate Jose A. Leido, Sr.
14 Felwa v. Salas, 19 SCRA 606; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336, Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1157.
15 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 824-825; Tan Ty v. Land Tenure Administration, 35 SCRA 250; Ichong, etc. et al v. Hernandez, supra.
16 Meklos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882.
17 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 1 L. ed. 2d 1485.
18 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79, 55 L. ed. 369, 372.
19 O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance, 282 U.S. 251.
20 People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56,95.
21 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall 14.
22 Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed., (1942) 56.
23 Sec. 144, Rep. Act 6388; Sec. 76, Rep. Act No. 180 as amended by Rep. Acts 599, 867, 2242, 3036, 3522, 3588, 4168, 4364 and 4421.
24 Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Ed., p. 9.
25 "Goverment Responsibility and Accountability", Rebuttal Speech of Delegate Vicente G. Sinco.
26 Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450.
27 Campbell and Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", A Survey Conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in October and November, 1965, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LI, No. 2, pp. 293, 303.
28 Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII.
29 Amendment No. 2 provides:
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof However, it shall not exercise the powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14[l] of the Constitution.
30 Thus, Section 13 of the 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 13. Sectoral representatives. — There shall be three sectors to be represented in the interim Batasang Pambansa, namely: (1) youth; (2) agricultural labor; and (3) industrial labor to be elected in the manner herein provided. Each sector shall be entitled to four sectoral representatives, two of whom shall come from Luzon, one from Visayas, and one from Mindanao: Provided, That the youth sector shall be entitled to two additional sectoral representatives who shall be elected from any region.
31 The pertinent provisions of the 1978 Election Code are the following.
SEC. 15. Sectors are national aggrupations. — The sectors named in Section 13 of Article 11 hereof shall be considered as national aggrupations and as such shall elect their respective national representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa through their own Electoral Councils which shall be constituted in the manner hereinafter provided.
SEC. 16. Delegates from provinces to the electoral councils. — At any time after the date of the election fixed herein, but not later than twenty days, the Kagawads representing agricultural labor, industrial labor and youth in the Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod of the municipalities and cities in every province shall meet at the provincial capital and, subject to the supervision of the Conunission or its authorized representatives, shall choose from among themselves one delegate of their sector to their respective Electoral Councils,
The meetings of the sectoral Kagawads shall be held separately at a time and place to be designated by the Commission or its authorized representatives. A majority of all the Kagawads of each sector shall constitute a quorum. The Kagawad obtaining the highest number of votes shag be the provincial delegate of the sector to the corresponding Electoral Council.
In the case of Metro Manila (Region IV), the members of the agricultural and industrial labor sectors in every barangay, if any, upon call of the barangay captain and under the supervision of the Commission, shall choose one Kagawad each for their respective sectors. The sectoral Kagawads elected shall meet on a date and at a place designated by the Conunission to choose from among theelves ten delegates each to their respective Electoral Councils.
In the case of the youth sector in Metro Manila, the Presidents of the Kabataang Barangay in the four cities and thirteen municipalities shall likewise elect from among theelves ten delegates for the youth sector to their Electoral Council.
Upon call of the Commission which shall be made not later than twenty days after the date of the election fixed herein and at such time as it may determine, existing national aggrupations of industrial labor and agricultural labor as accredited by the Department of Labor, and the Department of Agriculture and Department of Agrarian Reform, respectively ,shall elect to their Electoral Councils ten delegates for their respective sectors. The election shall be under the supervision of the Commission.
SEC. 17. Election and proclamation of sectoral remembers. — The delegates of each sector shall, upon call of the Commission, convene in Manila to elect from among those sectoral members who have filed their certificates of candidacy two representatives from each sector from Luzon, one from Visayas, and one from Mindanao. The delegates of the youth sector shall also elect the two additional representatives of their sector provided in Section 13, Article II of t Code. The Commission shall supervise the conduct of the election and proclaim the results thereof.
32 Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 3rd Publication , p. E. 16.
33 Reynaldo T. Fajardo, A New Party System for the Philippines; The New Constitution, by Cirilo Montejo, p. 199.
34 Explaining the operation of the provision on accreditation, Delegate Pacifico A. Ortiz said:
The second requirement is accreditation Let me explain the concept of and the need for accreditation. Section 3, par. (b) of t proposed article states: "A registered political party shall be entitled to accreditation only if in the immediately preceding elections under t Constitution it shag have obtained at least 5% of the votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation." Let us visualize the mechanics involved in t provision. Let us first suppose that hopefully we shall have the new Constitution ratified in June 1973. Secondly, let us suppose that the first national elections under t Constitution shall take place in November 1973. At these 1973 elections the political parties are registered but none shall be considered as yet accredited. All parties start under equal conditions at t political baseline — the first elections under t Constitution. Thirdly, let us suppose that in t 1973 elections only four registered parties obtain 5% or better of the votes cast for national offices. In that supposition, only these four registered parties shall be considered accredited as national parties; other parties which failed to gain at least 5% of the votes shall not be considered accredited. Fourthly, let us suppose that the next national or local elections will take place in 1975. In these 1975 elections only the four accredited national or local level which the Comelec may deem wise to extend, privileges which by their very nature can not be extended to all registered political parties in sentence without promoting the proliferation of splinter and nuisance parties or creating for the Comelec unsolvable proble of accommodation." ("The Meaning and Implications of Section 3 ", Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Pacifico A. Ortiz, Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 3rd Publication, pp, 24-25.)
35 Bell v. Hill, 74 S.W. (2d) 113, 114.
36 Ibid, p. 115.
37 Jesus E. Bigornia, Newsman's Notes, Bulletin Today, March 8, 1978.
38 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Five Years of the New Society.
39 Emerson, Freedom of Association 74 Yale Law Journal, 1, 4 (1964).
40 25 Am. Jur. 2nd 800; Bell v. Hill, supra, wherein the Supreme Court of Texas said:
In order that we may understand the questions involved in t case, it is essential that we clearly comprehend the nature of a political party, such as the Democratic Party. First of ala it is a voluntary association; an association formed of the free will and unrestrained choice of those who compose it. No man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party; or, after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for whatever reason see good to him and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause, A political party is the creation of free men, acting according to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever the creation of any department of the government. ...
41 Bell v. Hill, supra.
42 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927) 273 U. S. 70, 74 71 L. ed. 541, 47 S. Ct. 282, Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, p. 643; Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, pp. 41-42 (1974), citing Angara v. Electoral Com., 63 Phil. 139; Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 677, 681.
43 Section 2 of the 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC.2. Applicability. — This Code shall govern the election Of the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and, to the extent appropriate, elections for local officials, referenda and plebiscites.
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